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Text, Discourse, and the Demise of Meta-narratives 
One of the distinguishing characteristics of post-structuralist theory is its 
radical claims about the textuality of human experience. In the view of philoso-
pher Richard Rorty, the theoretical writings of Jacques Derrida and Michel 
Foucault are both characterized by a new theory of textuality that Rorty 
designates strong textualism. Derrida, Foucault, and other strong textualists, 
Rorty comments, "write as if there were nothing but texts."1 A number of 
scholarly approaches to the past, including literary new historicism and some 
variants of post-modern history, have accepted some form of strong textualism.2 
The problem of textuality is central to the entire movement of post-modernism 
and has serious consequences for the practice of history.3 Strong textualism 
effectively deconstructs the conventional historical categories of text and con-
text. For strong textualists, context is not a fixed background against which texts 
are read. Foreground and background are each textualized and the connections 
between them must be read inter-textually. 
Opposition to Derrida's radical theory of textuality has been voiced by 
historians on both the left and right of contemporary academic politics. For critics 
on the right, Derrida is cast as the most recent in a long line of neo-Nietzschean 
nihilists, while on the left Derrida is cast as the author of the latest narcissistic 
French intellectual fad. Derrida's radical claim that "there is nothing outside of 
the text" has been mistakenly interpreted to mean that there is no material reality, 
literally nothing outside of language.4 It makes more sense to interpret this claim 
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as a statement that it is impossible to interact with the world without the mediation 
of some language rooted in a particular culture. Everything is a text because 
everything experienced by human beings must be decoded and interpreted. Thus, 
philosophical systems and political systems are each capable of being read as 
texts. In response to his critics, Derrida has asserted that when he argues that 
everything, including an oppressive political institution such as apartheid, must 
be read as a text, he is not avoiding the hard realities of politics but directly 
challenging the existing politics of meaning that support oppressive systems such 
as apartheid. "I found it necessary," Derrida writes, "to recast the concept of text 
by generalizing it almost without limit That's why there is nothing 'beyond 
the text. ' That's why South Africa, and apartheid are, like you and me, part of this 
general text, which is not to say that it can be read the way one reads a book. That's 
why the text is always a field of forces."5 In Derridean terms, all human 
interactions are mediated by the pervasiveness of textuality. Individuals, the 
state, and apartheid are all part of a more general text, a meta-text, in which we 
are all inscribed. Although less poetic than Shakespeare's suggestion that all the 
world is a stage, Derrida's textualist model, resembles earlier dramaturgical 
models of reality, but restates the notion of the social construction of reality in 
especially forceful terms.6 
In contrast to dramaturgical models, Derrida's understanding of textuality 
places greater emphasis on the mutability of the many texts that constitute our 
world. Historians are probably most familiar with Derrrida' s claim that meaning 
of texts can not be anchored by authorial intent or context. His belief that the 
meaning of texts proliferates endlessly, it is important to note, is a philosophical 
assertion, not a sociological claim. In specific situations various forces work to 
actively constrain this process of iterability ? Thus, while asserting that meaning 
is slippery, Derrida also affirms that a variety of ideological forces actively 
constrains this process. What Derrida's radical approach to language seeks to do 
is de-naturalize language precisely so that the force of ideology can be brought 
into focus. A death row inmate may choose to read his/her sentence like a poem 
if he/ she chooses, but what he/ she can not do is enforce this reading. 
A different approach to textuality informs the work of Foucault. Abandoning 
the structuralist search for a set of general laws governing history, Foucault's 
early work elucidated the discontinuities and ruptures that undermined both 
traditional political narratives and the new more scientific narratives of historians 
such as those of the Annales School.8 The Enlightenment, typically associated 
with progress and emancipation in most narrative histories, is for Foucault the 
source of a new set of discourses and practices designed to limit and control the 
body and mind.9 While treating many subjects that historians of mentalities 
would find congenial, including the history of psychiatry and penal reform, 
Foucault explicitly rejected the methods of French historiography. His archeol-
ogy/genealogy sought to distance itself from both the history of ideas and the 
history of mentalities. Historians, he argued, had mistakenly sought an objective 
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reality, a total history. In opposition to this ideal, Foucault insisted that history 
"must turn away from all projects that claim to be global." Genealogy would not 
aspire to objectivity or completeness, but would instead accept that it could never 
be more than a "partial and local inquiry." Foucault attacked traditional 
historians for their deceptions, noting that they invariably took "unusual pains 
to erase the elements in their work which reveal their grounding in a particular 
time and place."10 This method was self-consciously "slanted, being a deliberate 
appraisal, affirmation, or negation" of the past. What Foucault sought in his 
history of systems of thought was not truth, but problematics; his inquiries were 
designed to expose the way particular discourses ordered and constructed the 
"reality" of the past.11 Foucault eschewed any vantage point from which a 
historian could actually "know" the truth of a past "reality." "Nothing in man— 
not even his body—is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self-recognition 
or for understanding other men." For Foucault, there are no stable objects of 
historical analysis, not the human body, the means of production, or the realm of 
the spirit. "The traditional devices for constructing a comprehensive view of 
history and for retracing the past," he writes, "must be systematically dismantled. 
. . . knowledge is not made for understanding."12 In place of the ideal of 
disinterested scholarship or objectivity, Foucault substitutes a form of engage-
ment. "One's point of reference should not be to the great model of language 
(langue) and signs, but to that of war . . . . relations of power, not relations of 
meaning."13 
Rather than begin with the text as an object of study, Foucault treats particular 
texts as the products of larger structures of meaning and power which he labels 
discourses. Foucault sees all human activity shaped by discourses which become 
the means by which various fields of human knowledge are constituted, orga-
nized, and enforced. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault describes his project as 
the analysis of "a corpus of knowledge, techniques, 'scientific' discourses . . . 
entangled with the practice of the power to punish." Seen in Foucauldean terms, 
authors, texts, and prisons are all constituted by discourse. The "micro-physics 
of power" charted by Foucault cannot be "localized in a particular type of 
institution or state apparatus" or in "the relations between the state and its citizens 
or on the frontier between classes."14 In contrast to the materialism and idealism 
of traditional historical inquiries, Foucault focuses on discourses that are simul-
taneously omnipresent yet not rooted in any particular social location. 
At the risk of simplification, one might say that Derrida expands the text to 
encompass all areas of human activity, while Foucault effectively shrinks the text 
to a mere affect of discourse. At one level, then, Derrida and Foucault stand at 
opposite poles on the continuum of post-structuralist theory. Yet, at the same time 
each of these theorists shares a commitment to a form of strong textualism. 
Literary theorist Edward Said views both of these thinkers in terms of their 
distinctive approaches to the problem of textuality. Said contrasts the slippery 
approach to textuality embraced by Derrida with the more deterministic view of 
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textuality found in Foucault's work.15 The approach to textuality found in each 
of these thinkers effectively challenges the conventional division between text 
and context essential to virtually all traditional forms of historiography. 
The work of Foucault and Derrida are essential to understanding the 
emergence of a distinctively post-modern view of history. In the Postmodern 
Condition, Jean-Francois Lyotard defined the essence of modernism as an appeal 
that "legitimates itself with reference to a metadiscourse . . . appealing to some 
grand narrative, such as the dialectics of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the 
emancipation of the rational or working subject, or the creation of wealth." In 
contrast to the modern, the post-modern is defined by an "incredulity toward 
metanarratives." In Lyotard's view, "the narrative function is losing its functors, 
its great hero, its great voyages, its great goal." In place of metanarratives, 
Lyotard envisions a multitude of "different language games—a heterogeneity of 
elements."16 
Derrida's deconstruction of western philosophy and Foucault's method of 
archeology/genealogy each have helped undermine meta-narratives. This 
challenge to modern historiography is most clearly articulated in Foucault. In 
contrast to the grand historical theories of Hegel, Marx, the Whigs, or even 
Ranke, Foucualt asserts that "history has no 'meaning,' though this is not to say 
that it is absurd or incoherent. On the contrary, it is intelligible and should be 
susceptible to analysis down to the smallest detail."17 Truth and knowledge are 
not set against the distortions of either power or ideology, both are manifesta-
tions of power. The critiques of meta-narratives, both in Derrida and Foucault, 
take aim at grand systems of interpretation, the search for universal truths, and the 
ideal of scholarly neutrality or objectivity.18 
A number of scholars have attempted to conceptualize how these new 
post-structuralist approaches to textuality might alter the practice of history, 
creating the possibility of a post-modern history. Given the impact of 
post-structuralist thought on contemporary literary criticism, it is hardly surpris-
ing that the most ardent calls for a post-modern history have come from literary 
critics who argue that the past is knowable only in a textualized form. Literary 
critic Catherine Belsey captures the central, animating impulse of this post-modern 
historiography when she declares confidently, "history is not offered as objective, 
authoritative, neutral or true . . . . on the contrary . . . it is irreducibly textual, 
offering no place outside discourse from which to interpret or judge."19 Belsey's 
stance is closely related to the views espoused by proponents of the new 
historicism in literary study. In the view of one of its leading advocates, Louis 
Montrose, the new wave in literary study affirms the "historicity of texts" and the 
"textuality of history." In the view of Montrose, "we can have no access to a full 
and authentic past, a lived material existence, unmediated by the surviving textual 
traces of the society in question."20 For new historicists, the opposition between 
text and context is itself a subject for deconstructive criticism. Contexts are 
treated as discursive constructions since they are assembled from texts that are 
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themselves the products of the power/knowledge schemes that caused certain 
texts to be created and then preserved in various archives. 
The challenge presented by post-modern history has prompted a number of 
reactions, including indifference, skepticism, anger, and, in a few cases, enthu-
siasm.21 While few historians have eagerly embraced post-modernism, a few 
prominent figures in the historical community have been receptive to the project 
of writing a post-modern history. One of the most ardent supporters of the new 
approach to textuality within the historical community is Dominick LaCapra, 
perhaps the most influential Derridean teaching in a history department. He has 
vociferously attacked the dominant "documentary model of knowledge" within 
the historical profession. LaCapra's critique of this approach to history contains 
two related components. First, he rejects the archival fetishism which holds that 
"the only significant historical questions are those that can be answered by 
empirical (preferably archival) research." Another problem with contextualism 
is its reductionism. "The notion of context may even serve as a way to get around 
texts and the problem of interpreting or reading them other than in reductively 
documentary ways. . . . it diverts attention from the way 'documents' are 
themselves texts that 'process' or rework 'reality' and require a critical reading." 
Such a view ignores the way in which "the documentary record is itself always 
textually processed before any given historian comes to it."22 Drawing more on 
Foucault than Derrida, historian Hayden White argues that "the text-context 
relationship, once an unexamined presupposition of historical investigation, has 
become a problem, not in the sense of being simply difficult to establish by the 
once vaunted 'rules of evidence,' butrather in the sense of becoming 'undecidable,' 
elusive, uncreditable."23 White endorses literary theorist Fredric Jameson's 
strong texualist stance, asserting that historical interpretation requires some 
version of "texualist theory." From White's point of view, the virtue of strong 
textualism is that it forces historians to examine the unstated textualist assump-
tions that already shape their work.24 Another enthusiastic supporter of both 
Foucauldean genealogy/archeology and Derridean deconstruction is women's 
historian Joan Scott. She recognizes that the new techniques are not the only 
method of critical reading available to historians. Post-structuralist interpretive 
strategies move beyond traditional historical efforts to expose the hidden 
meaning or the ideological significance of texts. The notion that everything may 
be read as a text, as complex social constructions laden with hidden meanings, has 
been especially useful to feminist scholars eager to expand the range of sources 
and questions central to historical inquiry. One obvious advantage of this 
approach for historians interested in gender is that it makes it possible to challenge 
the materialist bias of so much traditional historiography. Social history, both in 
its Marxist and non-Marxist forms, is effectively deconstructed by Scott. While 
the problem of gender can not be reduced to language, it is, for Scott, inextricably 
bound up with the problem of language. Post-structuralism therefore provides 
a powerful set of tools for women's historians eager to insure that gender is given 
61 
comparable weight to the analytical categories so often favored by materialists, 
particularly class or race. The new techniques also provide a means to challenge 
the masculinist biases of traditional intellectual history. If every text must be 
treated as a complex literary production, then the exclusion of women from the 
traditional literary and philosophical canon ceases to present a problem. Conduct 
books and cook books can take their place along side epics and philosophical 
treatises. Perhaps the most important benefit of the new approaches is that they 
force scholars to confront the silences and omissions in any symbolic/ideological 
system—gaps that are every bit as revealing as the positive record found in the 
archive.25 
The views of LaCapra, White, and Scott have hardly become typical of 
most historians. Still, as historian David Harlan observes, "the basic distinction 
between text and context may not have collapsed everywhere, but even among 
epistemological conservatives it seems to have become a problem."26 A number 
of post-modern assumptions have been particularly influential in the writings of 
historians associated with the new cultural history. Lynn Hunt, one of the leading 
proponents of the new cultural history, endorses the post-modern belief that 
"there is no such thing as history in the sense of a referential ground of 
knowledge." Hunt's stance is one measure of the success of the new textualism 
in re-orienting historical inquiry.27 A similar approach informs recent writing in 
American cultural history. The impact of post-modernism is also evident in 
Richard Wightman Fox and T. J. Jackson Lears's introduction to The Power of 
Culture, which argues that semiotics and critical theory have become central to 
the project of the new cultural history. "An emphasis on the inescapable textuality 
of all sources," Fox and Lears assert, has "freed historians from a positivist 
conception . . . and focused their attention on the fundamental task of interpreta-
tion."28 
Deconstructing Text and Context 
One of the most lucid discussions of the emergence of strong textualism can 
be found in literary theorist Stanley Fish's analysis of the problem of rhetoric in 
contemporary humanistic inquiry. While history and many other disciplines have 
long acknowledged the indispensable role of interpretation in the human sci-
ences, Fish identifies a new, more radical "interpretive turn" that starts with "the 
realization . . . that the givens of any of field of activity—including the facts it 
commands, the procedures it trusts in, and the values it expresses and extends— 
are socially and politically constructed."29 If Fish's characterization is correct and 
there is no escape from rhetoric, then the proponents of a radical theory of 
textuality will have largely succeeded in deconstructing the division between text 
and context, since both text and context will have been shown to be mere 
rhetorical constructions. 
Fish surveys a number of theorists in his discussion of the new rhetorical turn 
in humanistic inquiry, including the works of thinkers as diverse as J. L. Austin, 
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Thomas Kuhn, Jùrgen Habermas, Richard Rorty, and Jacques Derrida. Perhaps 
the most important aspect of Fish's treatment of rhetoric deals with the tension 
between the work of Austin and Derrida.30 From the point of view of practicing 
historians, this argument is particularly relevant since Austin's speech act theory 
is the basis for the most sophisticated efforts to ground historical contextualism, 
most notably the early theoretical writings of Quentin Skinner.31 Austin's speech 
act theory can be characterized as a form of strong contextualism. Meaning, 
Austin argued, was determined by the illocutionary force of an utterance, what an 
actor was doing by making a specific utterance in a particular context. The 
difference between Austin's view of context and Derrida's, is in Fish's scheme, 
"the difference between thinking of a context as something in the world and 
thinking of a context as a construction of'the world." Fish and Derrrida both claim 
that context can no more settle the meaning of a text than a text could establish 
a single unproblematic historical context.32 "One can no longer have any simple 
(that is non-interpretive) recourse to context in order to settle disputes or resolve 
doubts about meaning, because contexts, while they are productive of interpre-
tation, are also the products of interpretation." One of the most important 
philosophical points of contention between Austinians and Derrideans deals with 
the effort to distinguish between a promise delivered on stage and a promise 
delivered in the market place. For traditional historians, the line between fiction 
and history, between statements anchored by context and those of a more literary 
nature, depends upon drawing distinctions between these two types of speech 
acts. By separating ordinary language situations from literary speech, Austinians 
are able to support their belief in a form of strong contextualism. Derrideans 
have challenged the effort to distinguish literary speech from ordinary language. 
Promises made on stage are, in Derrida's view, exactly the same as promises 
made in the market place. The market place is merely another stage, one in which 
an equally artificial set of rules is in place to constrain the process of interpreta-
tion. The fact that promises are often kept in the market place is not a challenge 
to Derrida's theory. For a successful speech act to occur, for a promise to be 
understood, the two parties must share the same assumptions about what context 
will define the nature of the exchange. This is precisely the sort of ideological 
constraint that Derrida seeks to expose. "The contextual features of a simple 
exchange," Fish asserts, "are no less 'read' and therefore no more 'absolutely' 
constraining than the contextual features of a stage performance or of a conver-
sation reported in poem."33 One can interpret an electricity bill with a good deal 
of poetic license if one chooses, but it is unlikely that the power company will 
accept a deconstructive reading when the bill is due. The fact that the lights go out 
at the end of the month does not mean that one reading was more correct than 
another, rather it means that one reader is able to draw on more coercive force to 
enforce their reading. This obvious "fact" presents no problem to the strong 
textualist stance. The "correct reading" of the power company is not grounded 
in an epistemological reality, but in a sociological reality. As Fish notes, an 
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"utterance in a play is not the same as the citationality of a philosophical reference 
or a deposition before a court; it is just that no one of these performances is more 
serious—more direct, less mediated, less rhetorical—than any other."34 
Fish effectively captures the essential point of disagreement between tradi-
tional historians, strong contextualists, and most post-structuralists, strong 
textualists. To appreciate the difference between these two approaches to the 
past, it is important to distinguish strong textualist, epistemological claims from 
strong textualist, sociological claims. It is a caricature of post-structuralism to 
argue that because there is nothing outside of the text that all texts are equal, 
particularly with regard to their ability to draw on the resources of officially 
sanctioned interpreters. The most astute proponents of deconstruction have never 
denied that ideological forces constrain the free play of textual meaning or that 
ideological forces can be brought to bear to enforce an official reading of a text. 
This is precisely Derrida's point when he notes that apartheid is a text, but that it 
is a text that cannot be read like a book. New historicist literary critic Louis 
Montrose makes a comparable argument when he claims that "recent theories of 
textuality have argued persuasively that the referent of a linguistic sign cannot be 
fixed; that the meaning of the text can not be stabilized." Yet, Montrose 
recognizes "at the same time, writing and reading are always historically and 
socially determinate events." The appropriate response of scholars is to "simul-
taneously acknowledge the theoretical indeterminacy of the signifying process 
and the historical specificity of discursive practices." 
Even if historians acknowledge that the view of textuality advocated by 
Derrida and the new historicist literary critics is more nuanced than many hostile 
commentators have suggested, one might still legitimately ask the question: is 
there no alternative to strong textualism? Is it true that if all knowledge of the 
past is mediated by a pervasive textuality and all texts are equally rhetorical, that 
history is merely another branch of poetics or literary criticism? 
The Levelling of Genre Distinctions: Three Critiques 
Several theoretical traditions provide an alternative to the strong textualism 
of French post-structuralism and the strong contextualism of traditional histori-
ography. While conceding that all artifacts must be interpreted, these alternative 
theoretical traditions recognize that there are important differences between the 
many types of texts that historian use to constitute context. While some of these 
texts can, and ought to be, linked to other texts inter-textually, other texts require 
a different set of hermeneutic strategies to be decoded. By recognizing that the 
historian must employ several hermeneutic approaches, it is possible to preserve 
the distinctions between tax lists, death warrants, canon shells, and poems. It 
may well be that within certain contexts a death warrant may be read like a poem, 
and a poem may well, in some circumstances, be far more "real" than a canon 
shell. Deciding among these alternatives requires not strong textualism, but a 
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revised theory of contextualism. A number of theorists, some post-modern and 
others decidedly opposed to post-modernism, offer historians a variety of ways 
of recasting the contextualist enterprise. 
One of the most vocal critics of post-structuralism and post-modernism is the 
German critical theorist Jiirgen Habermas.35 In the Philosophical Discourse of 
Modernity, Habermas challenges the leading theorists of post-modernism and 
seeks to provide a new defense of Enlightenment rationalism. To achieve this 
goal, Habermas synthesizes German hermeneutics, American pragmatism, 
Austinian speech act theory, and Frankfurt school Marxism. One of the most 
important contributions of Habermas to recent theoretical debate is his critique 
of the controversy between Derrideans and Austinians. Crucial to this argument 
is his effort to re-establish a distinction between literary discourse and other types 
of utterances, which he labels as forms of communicative action. The latter 
concept is central to Habermas's philosophical project and refers to utterances 
designed to promote inter-subjective communication."36 At the core of this 
critique is a challenge to the Derridean move to level the genre distinction 
between literary and non-literary speech, the belief that promises made on stage 
and promises made in the market place are equally rhetorical. "Language games," 
Habermas writes, "only work because they presuppose idealizations that tran-
scend any particular language game . . . these idealizations give rise to the 
perspective of an agreement that is open to criticism on the basis of validity 
claims. A language operating under these kinds of constraints is subject to an 
ongoing test."37 The effort to distinguish between ordinary speech and literary 
speech is sanctioned by its utility in solving real world problems. Habermas's 
disagreement with Derrida is ably summarized by Thomas McCarthy, who notes 
that "Habermas defends a position that while not denying the omnipresence and 
ineradicability of rhetorical and poetic elements in everyday discourse insists on 
distinguishing those contexts in which the poetic function predominate... from 
those in which it plays a subordinate and supplementary role."38 From Habermas's 
point of view, and in contradistinction to Derrida and Fish, the argument that a 
poem and a death warrant might each use literary devices should not obscure the 
fact that one text is more literary than another. The claim that a poem and a death 
warrant each employ rhetorical/literary strategies does not mean that both types 
of texts are equally rhetorical. Historian Martin Jay's succinct characterization 
of Habermas's critique of both traditional hermeneutics and deconstruction 
reiterates the problem that the strong textualist thesis poses for historians. 
"Because certain social forms can be read as if they were languages, there is no 
reason to suppose their linguisticality exhausts their being."39 From a Habermasean 
point of view, not only are all texts not created equal, but all texts are not equally 
rhetorical. 
Another forceful critique of strong textualism from the modernist perspec-
tive has been formulated by Marxists, particularly neo-Marxists. Historian 
Elizabeth Fox-Genovese employs a language similar to Habermas's when she 
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warns that the new textualism may confuse, rather than clarify, questions about 
power. "It is possible to classify price series or coin deposits or hog weights or 
railroad lines as texts—possible, but ultimately useful only as an abstraction that 
flattens historically and theoretically significant distinctions."40 A similar chal-
lenge to the post-structuralist move to blur the genre distinction between literature 
and other forms of communication has been articulated by Marxist literary critic 
Terry Eagleton, whose sharpest criticism is reserved for Foucault. In particular, 
Eagleton calls attention to Foucault's notion of power as a "pervasive, intangible 
network of forces which weaves itself into our slightest gestures and most 
intimate utterances." The problem with such an expansive view of power is that 
it ceases to have any analytical value as a tool for describing the different effects 
of power. "If there are no values and beliefs not bound up with power," the 
concept of power itself "threatens to expand to a vanishing point . . . . to stretch 
these terms to the point where they become coextensive with everything is simply 
to empty them of force." From the perspective of Marxism, such a move is 
especially problematic since it distorts the goal of radical liberation. In opposition 
to Foucault, Eagleton champions the more traditional Marxist concept of ideol-
ogy, whose utility rests precisely in its ability to "discriminate between those 
power struggles which are somehow central to a whole form of social life, and 
those which are not."41 
A concern with the problem of textuality is also central to the work of the 
Cultural Studies Movement. The Cultural Studies paradigm has challenged the 
base/superstructure metaphor so crucial to traditional Marxist theory, and with it, 
the rigid materialism of an earlier generation of Marxism. A number of common, 
intellectual themes unite this heterogeneous, theoretical camp. Cultural studies 
begins with Antonio Gramsci's theory of hegemony. While Cultural Studies 
shows a marked preference for the study of popular culture, this methodology is 
easily adaptable to the study of high culture as well. Cultural Studies treats the 
textualized artifacts of the past as forms of cultural production—ideological 
texts—that must be decoded and analyzed in terms of their contribution to the 
struggle between the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic ideologies of a particu-
lar society. As the emphasis on the term cultural production suggests, ideological 
texts have a material reality. Cultural texts must be produced and distributed as 
well as coded and decoded. For scholars employing this method, it is important 
to explore the production, distribution, and reception of cultural texts.42 
In contrast to the modernist critiques of Habermas and Eagleton, Richard 
Rorty challenges strong textualism from the perspective of post-modernism. The 
neo-pragmatism articulated by Rorty accepts the strong textualists' challenge to 
the western metaphysical tradition. Such a challenge, however, can not provide 
an adequate grounding for modern morality, politics, or history.43 Against the 
claims of strong textualism, Rorty affirms the point of view of a group of weak 
textualists who include proponents of the hermeneutic tradition, both in its 
German and American incarnations.44 "The weak textualist" recognizes "that 
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there is a great difference between what scientists do and what critics do." For 
weak textualists, "the fact that the former often agree and the latter usually don't 
shows something about the natures of their respective subject-matters, or about 
the special epistemological difficulties encountered by their respective meth-
ods." Neo-pragmatists have no trouble accepting the Derridean critique of 
western metaphysics; philosophers can never hope to escape from the web of 
culture and hence the problem of textuality. "The pragmatist reminds us that a 
new vision and a useful vocabulary is just that, not a sudden unmediated vision 
of things or texts as they are."45 
Consider a neo-pragmatist response to the problem of how to handle the 
differences between poems and death warrants, or promises delivered in the 
market place and promises delivered on stage. An anti-foundationalist would 
reject the effort to ground this distinction philosophically as an illusionary quest. 
At best, such distinctions can be grounded historically and politically. When we 
agree to treat poems and death warrants differently or accept the difference 
between promises made in plays and those made in economic transactions, we 
also accept that these diverse texts are not equally rhetorical. Accepting these 
sorts of distinctions is part of the price we pay to participate in a collective 
conversation that is our only hope to preserve and perfect our liberal values. For 
Rorty, the goal of philosophy is to insure that particular language games work as 
fairly as possible. A more inclusive and just pluralism is the goal of Rorty's 
vision, not some form of radical liberation. In this sense, Rorty is receptive to 
Derrida and Foucault's epistemological critiques at the same time that he rejects 
the explicit radicalism and the implicit pessimism arising from their epistemol-
ogy.46 Rather than abandon liberal humanism, Rorty merely seeks to perfect it in 
a gradual, evolutionary manner. Rorty provides a liberal vision shorn of 
traditional pragmatism's optimistic faith in the inevitable progress of enlighten-
ment. 
This perspective has been championed by a number of American intellectual 
historians, and Rorty has himself contributed to an important volume on the 
history of philosophy co-edited by Quentin Skinner and Jerome Schneewind. At 
a time when many influenced by post-structuralism have rejected intellectual 
history as another outmoded form of historical analysis, Rorty has championed 
intellectual history, the effort to describe "what the intellectuals were up to at a 
given time, and of their interactions with the rest of society."47 Rather than move 
in the direction of radical textualization, Rorty moves in the opposite direction, 
broad contextualization. Rorty's brand of anti-essentialism seeks to expand the 
range of contexts in which particular texts might be interpreted. Rather than seek 
the essence of a text, its true meaning, Rorty advocates a "polymorphous " 
position, one which would encourage us to "desire to dream up as many new 
contexts as possible."48 In place of Derredian free play, Rorty substitutes a form 
of contextual pluralism. Historians, political philosophers, and social critics 
ought to explore the way ideas can function in new and unexpected ways in 
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different contexts. The impact of this type of contextual pluralism is evident in 
the most recent writings of J.G. A. Pocock and Quentin Skinner, both of whom 
have recast their earliest theoretical statements in a manner more sympathetic to 
aRortyean perspective. Pocock's early invocation of Kuhn's theory of paradigms 
has been replaced by Stanley Fish's notion of interpretive community. Pocock 
now casts his approach to the history of political thought in terms of the dynamic 
interaction between the authors of texts and their readers. Similarly, Skinner, 
while continuing to stress his own interest in authorial intent, has recognized the 
importance of reader-response to intellectual history.49 
Rorty's brand of pragmatism has also been championed by a number of 
American intellectual historians, including David Hollinger and James 
Kloppenberg. Hollinger is undoubtedly correct when he asserts that there is a 
"continuity between what intellectual historians do and what Rorty wants 
philosophers to do."50 The approach favored by Hollinger and Kloppenberg 
seeks a middle ground between strong textualism and strong contextualism. 
Hollinger and Kloppenberg advise historians to explore the connections between 
particular discourses and distinctive discursive communities. 
Rorty also takes up the challenge to meta-narratives associated with the work 
of Lyotard. He accepts the claim that there is no neutral ground upon which 
different narrative claims can be adjudicated. The rejection of meta-narratives, 
should not, however, prevent historians from continuing to defend the validity 
of local knowledge and first-order narratives, specific stories about specific 
peoples at specific times.51 The critique of meta-narratives has served a useful 
function by facilitating the recovery of the histories of marginalized groups. Yet, 
having conceded this point, Rorty continues to believe in the efficacy of 
particular local narratives. To validate this strategy, Rorty invokes Dewey as an 
alternative to either Foucault or Lyotard. As Rorty notes, "Dewy thought that we 
could have a morally uplifting historical narrative without bothering to erect a 
metaphysical backdrop."52 Local narrative, in Rorty's view, is precisely the form 
of historiography appropriate to liberal pluralist democracy. Every culture needs 
stories, and it is the job of historians to tell the best stories that embody the liberal 
pluralist values of our culture.53 
How should historians respond to the challenges presented by strong 
textualism and post-modernism? Philosopher Richard Bernstein's observations 
about the reaction of American philosophers to post-structuralism also accu-
rately reflect the typical range of responses that have characterized the American 
historical profession: 
"( 1 ) total ignorance and uninformed silence 
(2) polemical attacks 
(3) endless internal commentary and textual analysis"54 
It is understandable that historians would grow impatient with the suggestion that 
recent theory will render all historical inquiry obsolete. Resistance among 
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historians is even more understandable given that relatively little scholarship has 
emerged that applies the new methods in a concrete and compelling fashion. 
What has been most lacking is an actual agenda for research, one attuned to the 
notorious problems associated with the archive, both in Foucault's sense of the 
term and the more conventional empirical sense in which historians use the term. 
Historians, in contrast to theorists, need to grapple with the existing documentary 
record while remaining sensitive to the silences and omissions in the archive. The 
practical problems faced by historians seem to have prompted little if any useful 
speculation on the part of theorists. 
The Dialectic of Text and Context 
Rather than reject all theory as so much sound and fury, ultimately signifying 
nothing, it makes more sense for historians to draw on a range of theories 
compatible with the trajectory of modern American historiography. A number 
of the theoretical perspectives outlined in this essay suggest the basis for thinking 
about a post-modern history that would not only be compatible with recent 
American historiography, but which might improve the practice of history. While 
there are important theoretical divisions and points of conflict separating 
Rorteyeans, Habermaseans, and Neo-Marxists, a few points of commonality do 
exist and might provide the basis for constituting a post-modern historiography. 
Meta-narratives 
The debate about the status of meta-narratives resembles historical debates 
about the need for synthesis. American historians have been troubled by the 
fragmentation of the field for some time. The contemporary crisis of American 
historiography is, in large measure, a result of the success of the new social 
history. This crisis hardly comes as a surprise to post-modernists. The prolifera-
tion of empirical data demonstrating that no single narrative can account for the 
diversity of the American experience resembles the post-modern claim that all 
meta-narratives engage in a politics of exclusion that stigmatizes and marginalizes 
subaltern groups.55 Thus, from both Foucault and Derrida' s point of view, both 
the consensus history of an older generation and the heroic counter narratives 
favored by many left-leaning historians are each objectionable, because they seek 
a uniform, homogenous, subject and employ linear models of change and 
causality. One of the reasons that post-modernism has drawn the ire of both the 
left and the right in the contemporary academy is that it has challenged both the 
idea of history from the top down and history from the bottom up. Each of these 
perspectives is dependent on a questionable meta-narrative. 
Advocates for the perspective of excluded groups have expressed reserva-
tion about new calls for synthesis. Historian Nell Painter have wisely called 
attention to the dangers that new calls for synthesis pose to groups traditionally 
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excluded from older narrative historians. Perhaps the time is right to abandon the 
goal of synthesis and accept the fragmented nature of local knowledge. It might 
be time for historians to recognize that it is impossible to write a single narrative 
that includes the life of the Maine mid-wife Martha Ballard and the creation of 
the American republic without establishing some sort of hierarchy.56 
Abandoning older conceptions of narrative need not be the occasion for 
lament, or lead to another round of angst-ridden jeremiads in leading historical 
journals. Post-modernism opens up a number of new and exciting possibilities 
for historians. Chaos theory and nonlinear dynamics might provide a new set 
of organizing metaphors for historical scholarship. It is important to recall that 
historians have barely adjusted to the epistemological crisis of modernity, let 
alone the crisis of post-modernity. Historian Peter Burke is undoubtedly correct 
when he observes that modernist literary, and cinematic techniques are only just 
beginning to have an impact on historical narrative. Montage, flashback, 
cross-cutting, standard modernist literary and cinematic techniques have been 
embraced by relatively few historians. Since historians have not yet caught up 
with modernism, it is hardly surprising that they have not yet grappled with 
post-modernism. 
Perhaps the emergence of CD-ROM technology may make it possible to 
create a truly post-modern narrative. Hyper-text makes it possible to generate a 
non-linear narrative structure in which readers can jump from one place in the text 
to another and create their own counter-narrative. Hyper-text creates the 
possibility of an interactive mode of reading in which-the author self-consciously 
relinquishes considerable control over the narrative to the reader. The possibili-
ties of a post-modern narrative, American history in the age of MTV, have barely 
been hinted at by the most avant garde historians. A CD-ROM history would 
allow readers to choose which narrative line to follow, that of Martha Ballard, 
or the more traditional political history chronology culminating in the ratification 
of the Constitution. Readers might also deconstruct an interpretation by calling 
up both the primary sources materials and competing interpretations of other 
scholars. It might even be possible to have readers interact with authors via the 
Internet.57 
While technology may solve some of our problems as scholars, daunting 
epistemological problems remain. The post-modern critique of meta-narratives, 
while liberating in some ways, does present new problems for historians. The 
prevailing liberal assumptions that guide most historians can easily accomodate 
the notion that no single narrative might encompass the diverse experiences of 
African-Americans, women, and gays. What can post-modern history do about 
Holocaust denial?58 After Foucault, is it still possible to justify the exclusion 
of any paradigm? Post-modern history must formulate a coherent response to this 
political and epistemological challenge if it is to survive as a viable historical 
enterprise. 
Rortyeans, by contrast, are less troubled by the implications of Foucault. 
Historian Thomas Haskell's defense of a "moderate historicist point of view" 
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might well be the best epistemological alternative available to historians at the 
moment. In terms that Rorty and Habermas might each find compelling, Haskell 
affirms "mankind's persistent effort to achieve impersonal and inter-subjective 
knowledge about morality, even in the face of perpetual and predictable disap-
pointment." This effort, Haskell notes, "to be 'objective' constitutes a very 
deeply rooted practice, and it therefore deserves the respect of all who claim to 
appreciate in a balanced way both the strengths and the limitations of theoretical 
reason."59 It may well be true that another generation of scholars will expose our 
model of persuasion as yet another exercise of power designed to exclude and 
marginalize legitimate forms of historical analysis. Ultimately, there is no 
response to Derrida or Foucault that can provide assurances that the exclusion of 
some idea will not later be shown to have been merely a brute exercise of power, 
precisely the form of domination that French Post-structuralists have sought to 
expose. All we can do is try to establish rules that favor persuasion over force and 
which seem at the time to embody principles of procedural neutrality. For the 
moment, Rorty and Habermas may be the best that historians can hope for in their 
effort to ground historical inquiry. 
A Hermeneutics of Suspicion 
Strong textualism, particularly deconstructive readings, have been espe-
cially effective in revealing how particular ideas and social groups have been 
marginalized or rendered invisible by particular historical discourses. Various 
techniques for "reading against the grain" have been developed to identify the 
ideological forces that have stigmatized particular groups or ideas and that have 
either rendered their experiences aberrant, or in some cases, invisible in earlier 
histories. Even if historians reject strong textualism, the utility of reading against 
the grain continues to merit further consideration. The strong readings of many 
post-structuralist literary critics provide models of sophisticated textual exegesis 
and could well help historians improve their textual skill. 
No group within the historical community has been more directly engaged 
with both the problems and promise of deconstructive reading than have 
women's historians. For some, deconstruction threatens to erase the achieve-
ments of women's history by depriving women's history of its claim to accurately 
represent the reality of women's lives in the past. Social historian Louise Tilly's 
reaction to deconstruction is typical of this response. For Tilly, deconstruction 
questions "the existence of a real world and the possibility of knowing it and 
explaining." Others argue that opposition to deconstruction itself needs to be 
deconstructed to expose the current hierarchies governing the writing of all 
history, including women's history.60 Is it possible that Tilly's invocation of the 
real is just another rhetorical construction designed to empower a certain type of 
social historical inquiry at the expense of other alternative discourses? This is 
precisely the sort of argument that Joan Scott has used against the critiques of 
deconstruction that invoke a reified notion of the "real" to attack post-structuralist 
theory.61 
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The application of deconstruction to historiography may ultimately turn out 
to be the most useful application of post-structuralism to historical problems. 
Deconstructive techniques were developed to read the complex texts of the 
philosophical and literary canon. Even if it makes little sense for historians to 
embrace strong textualism when interpreting the past, the writing of history in the 
present is undeniably a textual enterprise. Deconstructive readings of historiog-
raphy do not pose the same sort of epistemological problems that deconstructive 
readings of the past pose for historians. Historiography is a good candidate for 
the application of such techniques, since the goal of scholarship is not necessarily 
the reconstruction of the mind or beliefs of an author. Historiography is already 
a meta-historical commentary on the literary and rhetorical structure of history. 
Deconstructive readings of historiography might help historians understand how 
particular discourses order and invariably distort our understanding of the past. 
A good example of how such readings strategies can improve the writing 
of contemporary history may be found in Bruce Cumings's analysis of 
counter-revisionist scholarship in diplomatic history. Admittedly, Cumings's 
deconstructive reading owes more to Foucault than to Derrida. Still, his effort 
to read against the grain is designed to expose the underlying rhetorical/ 
ideological structure of counter-revisionist scholarship. In particular, Cumings 
demonstrates how counter-revisionist John Gaddis's rhetoric employs a 
"hermeneutics of censure and exclusion" that uses a series of rhetorical tropes, 
not traditional historical evidence, to link revisionist scholarship with a variety 
of unacceptable historical practices: political posturing, monocausal interpre-
tations, narrowness, and insufficient archival research. As Cumings observes, 
regarding Gaddis' s discussion of revisionism, the "treatment is purely discursive, 
designed rhetorically to malign the enemy, close off debate." While Cumings's 
conclusion that ideology has shaped the writing of diplomatic history is hardly 
novel, his shrewd explication of the rhetorical strategies by which those ideologi-
cal debates were conducted owes much to the hermeneutics of suspicion associ-
ated with recent critical theory. Cumings concludes his study of recent 
historiography with a plea to recognize the centrality of textuality to the historical 
enterprise. "History is not a narrative of . . . 'what actually happened'; nor is it 
a Jack Webb quest after ' the facts. ' "62 In place of the dominant empirical model 
of historical inquiry, Cumings proposes a hermeneutic approach shaped by recent 
critical theory. 
Culture and the Public Sphere 
The publication of Habermas ' s important theoretical writings on the creation 
of the public sphere have sparked considerable interest among historians and 
literary scholars.63 Habermas's work identified the emergence of historically 
specific discursive category which he labeled the bourgeois public sphere. The 
inter-related ideals of rational communication and open debate conducted among 
free citizens was, he argued, closely connected to the rise of bourgeois political 
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thought in the eighteenth century. One way of understanding Habermas's use of 
this term is to contrast it with the civic republican ideal of the public. The new 
bourgeois public sphere was tied to the growth of a distinctive sphere of literary 
production that allowed citizens to discuss politics in the medium of print. The 
notion of public opinion, the deliberative and rational will of the people, was 
therefore not identical to the classical republican ideal of a transcendent common 
good that could be ascertained by the assembled citizenry acting in a manner 
consistent with civic virtue.64 
While the public sphere has generated considerable excitment among 
historians, an explosion of new studies of the public sphere will not solve all of 
the problems posed by post-modernism. Nor will simply turning our attention to 
the public sphere eliminate the fragmentation created by the new social history. 
Generating a new meta-narrative around the emergence and growth of the public 
sphere would merely substitute an older set of hierarchies for a new set. Still, 
the identification of the public sphere as a subject for historical inquiry has 
generated considerable interest among historians. The two most important 
historical trends evident in studies of the public sphere are the recognition of 
multiple spheres of publicity and a more systematic inquiry into the complex 
material and cultural factors that shaped the emergence and evolution of the 
public sphere.65 
American historian Mary Ryan's critique of Habermas emerges from the 
perspective of social and women's history. Her work focuses on the multiple 
spheres of publicity in 19th century America and the contested nature of these 
different versions of the public sphere. Ryan finds that the study of the public 
sphere does not so much provide the basis for a new synthesis as suggest further 
avenues to explore the conflicts that shaped American political culture. Historian 
Geoff Eley finds that a large body of scholarship in eighteenth-century English 
history, particularly that of J. H. Plumb and John Brewer, essentially vindicates 
Habermas's theoretical conjectures. Plumb and Brewer provide a rich analytical 
narrative exposing both the ideological and institutional mechanisms facilitating 
the growth of the public sphere in Britain.66 While recognizing the utility of 
Habermas's original formulation, Ely also concurs with Ryan about the need to 
explore multiple publics and further advises historians to connect studies of the 
public sphere with the questions of hegemony. Rather than view the public 
sphere as a neutral medium of rational communication, it is important to 
recognize that the public sphere functioned to both enable and limit certain forms 
of discourse and certain courses of action. 
The notion of a public sphere does provide a useful tool for conceptualizing 
the cultural and political matrix that connected particular discourses and 
discursive communities to one another. What studies of the public sphere can do 
is help clarify the role of public culture as a medium in which particular political 
and social struggles are debated and sometimes resolved. Indeed, one way of 
understanding the public sphere is that it constitutes a meta-discursive space in 
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which specific discourses exist and more importantly, in which competing 
discourses vie for dominance. 
Authors and Readers 
Strong textualist claims about the death of the author are too extreme for most 
historians who still may have an interest in discerning an author's intent. It is, 
however, important to acknowledge that once published, texts often circulate in 
a public sphere in which an author's intent may not control the meaning of the 
text. When appropriated by particular interpretive/discursive communities, texts 
can be read in a multitude of different ways. Indeed, it is often the response of 
diverse readers, not an author's intent, that determines the most important 
historical meaning of a text. The historical application of reader-response theory 
is as yet fairly rudimentary. Historical studies of reader-response have not 
generally been sensitive to the problems of evidence historians routinely confront 
when they undertake empirical archival research. Still, text-oriented 
reader-response criticism can be of use to historians. The notion of implied 
readers, or ideal readers, do provide historians a useful starting place for 
analyzing various texts and the imagined audience they sought to address. Such 
inquiries must be supplemented with empirical evidence about the behavior of 
actual readers. A variety of different types of evidence, including marginalia, 
commonplace books, diaries, and letters, do provide potential sources for 
historical ethnographies of reading. In some cases, historians might well happen 
upon a cache of documents that reveal detailed information about the way readers 
actually interpreted the texts they read. One additional strategy suggested by 
post-structuralist theory that could be useful to historians is the concept of 
inter-textual reading. If every author is also a reader, and every text is also a 
reading of other texts, it is possible to use texts as proxies of larger patterns of 
reading. Uniting all of these diverse textual strategies together can help historians 
plot a map of the diverse interpretive/discursive communities of a given period.67 
Hegemony and Counter-Hegemony 
American intellectual historians have borrowed theoretical and method-
ological insights from Thomas Khun, Clifford Geertz, and more recently, 
Richard Rorty. The neo-pragmatism characterisitic of these thinkers has been 
most useful at providing models for studying discrete groups of intellectuals, 
particularly those functioning in a self-conscious fashion as an intellectual 
community.68 This approach is less likely to work for political discourses such 
as republicanism, since political communities do not show the same sort of 
cohesion usually displayed by intellectuals. Political languages, unlike many of 
the discourses of intellectuals, are more likely to be composed of essentially 
contested concepts than formal paradigms. In the case of politics it is also 
important to recognize that texts circulate in public sphere in which authors can 
not always control the meanings attributed to their work. Politics seldom 
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resembles the free market place of ideas that liberal political theory so esteems: 
exchanges are never free from distortions created by the asymmetrical power 
relations that characterize all complex societies. The problem of hegemony, 
therefore, remains crucial to the task of analyzing the exchange of ideas between 
different discursive communities. Any effort to plot a map of the diverse 
discourses and different discursive communities in various periods of American 
history must invariably deal with questions of power. The central problematic of 
the Cultural Studies Movement, the analysis of the struggle between hegemonic 
and counter-hegemonic ideologies, has not been central to the practice of much 
American intellectual history. Greater attention to questions of production, 
distribution, and reception will only improve the writing of intellectual history. 
Conclusion 
The perspective of Rortyeans, Habermaseans, and Neo-Marxists each have 
particular advantages for historians of American culture. Rather than embrace the 
strong textualist program associated with Derrida, Foucault, and literary new 
historicism, historians need to explore the range of alternative theoretical tradi-
tions that address the problem of textuality in ways more useful to the project of 
historical inquiry. Instead of rejecting all recent theory in the hope that, like the 
latest French fashion fads, these ideas will simply disappear if we wait long 
enough, historians need to formulate an informed response to the new textualism. 
Engagement with recent theory can, if properly conceptualized, provide histori-
ans with a variety of useful tools to carry on their craft in the post-modern era.69 
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